Reading: Woollard, Fiona. "Motherhood and Mistakes about Defeasible Duties to Benefit." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2016).
Summary: Discussion of the behaviour of pregnant women and mothers, in academic literature, medical advice given to mothers, mainstream media and social media, assumes that a mother who fails to do something to benefit her child is liable for moral criticism unless she can provide sufficient countervailing considerations to justify her decision. I reconstruct the normally implicit reasoning that leads to this assumption and show that it is mistaken. First, I show that the discussion assumes that if any action might benefit her child, the mother has a defeasible duty to perform that action. I suggest that this assumption is implicitly supported by two arguments but that each argument is unsound. The first argument conflates moral reasons and defeasible duties; the second misunderstands the scope of a defeasible duty to benefit. This argument has important practical and theoretical implications: practically, it provides a response to a highly damaging discourse on maternal behaviour; theoretically, it provides the framework for a clearer understanding of the scope and nature of defeasible duties to benefit.
Link: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12355/abstract
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Saturday, October 28, 2017
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
Update: Feminist Philosophy Reading List (Weeks 7 & 8)
Please note the following changes to the feminist philosophy reading list for Michaelmas:
I will distribute copies of my paper draft in advance for Week 7. I hope to see many of you this Thursday to discuss Alcoff's "Visible Identities" (2006)!
- Week 7: Figueroa, Charlotte. "On the Distinction between Objectifying Attitudes and Objectifying Actions" (draft).
- Week 8: Krause, Sharon R. “Contested Questions, Current Trajectories: Feminism in Political Theory Today.” Politics & Gender, vol. 7, no. 1, 2011, pp. 105–111.
I will distribute copies of my paper draft in advance for Week 7. I hope to see many of you this Thursday to discuss Alcoff's "Visible Identities" (2006)!
Saturday, October 21, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 3)
Reading: Alcoff, Linda Martín. "Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self." Vol. 10. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; Chapter 5, The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, and Chapter 6, The Metaphysics of Gender and Sexual Difference.
Summary: In the heated debates over identity politics, few theorists have looked carefully at the conceptualizations of identity assumed by all sides. "Visible Identities" fills this gap. Drawing on both philosophical sources as well as theories and empirical studies in the social sciences, Martín Alcoff makes a strong case that identities are not like special interests, nor are they doomed to oppositional politics, nor do they inevitably lead to conformism, essentialism, or reductive approaches to judging others. Identities are historical formations and their political implications are open to interpretation. But identities such as race and gender also have a powerful visual and material aspect that eliminativists and social constructionists often underestimate. "Visible Identities" offers a careful analysis of the political and philosophical worries about identity and argues that these worries are neither supported by the empirical data nor grounded in realistic understandings of what identities are. Martín Alcoff develops a more realistic characterization of identity in general through combining phenomenological approaches to embodiment with hermeneutic concepts of the interpretive horizon. Besides addressing the general contours of social identity, Martín Alcoff develops an account of the material infrastructure of gendered identity, compares and contrasts gender identities with racialized ones, and explores the experiential aspects of racial subjectivity for both whites and non-whites. In several chapters she looks specifically at Latino identity as well, including its relationship to concepts of race, the specific forms of anti-Latino racism, and the politics of mestizo or hybrid identity.
Link: https://dascolihum.com/uploads/CH_54A_Alcoff_Racism_and_Visible_Race_Ch_8.pdf
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: In the heated debates over identity politics, few theorists have looked carefully at the conceptualizations of identity assumed by all sides. "Visible Identities" fills this gap. Drawing on both philosophical sources as well as theories and empirical studies in the social sciences, Martín Alcoff makes a strong case that identities are not like special interests, nor are they doomed to oppositional politics, nor do they inevitably lead to conformism, essentialism, or reductive approaches to judging others. Identities are historical formations and their political implications are open to interpretation. But identities such as race and gender also have a powerful visual and material aspect that eliminativists and social constructionists often underestimate. "Visible Identities" offers a careful analysis of the political and philosophical worries about identity and argues that these worries are neither supported by the empirical data nor grounded in realistic understandings of what identities are. Martín Alcoff develops a more realistic characterization of identity in general through combining phenomenological approaches to embodiment with hermeneutic concepts of the interpretive horizon. Besides addressing the general contours of social identity, Martín Alcoff develops an account of the material infrastructure of gendered identity, compares and contrasts gender identities with racialized ones, and explores the experiential aspects of racial subjectivity for both whites and non-whites. In several chapters she looks specifically at Latino identity as well, including its relationship to concepts of race, the specific forms of anti-Latino racism, and the politics of mestizo or hybrid identity.
Link: https://dascolihum.com/uploads/CH_54A_Alcoff_Racism_and_Visible_Race_Ch_8.pdf
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Thursday, October 19, 2017
Acquired Perceptions of Philosophy as Masculine
"A recent study looks at whether perceptions about how “masculine” philosophy is can help explain the gender disparities in the field.
In “21% versus 79%: Explaining Philosophy’s Gender Disparities with Stereotyping and Identification,” forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, authors Debbie Ma, Clennie Webster, Nanae Tachibe, and Robert Gressis (all at CSU Northridge), present data that, they argue, supports the idea that male domination in philosophy could be eroded ... by changing how it is taught.
They find that students who haven’t taken much philosophy do not have a sense that the field is male-dominated, but they come to have this view the more philosophy they study, and that further, the degree to which women students see philosophy as masculine, the less interested they are in majoring in it."
—From 'The Perception of Philosophy as Masculine' (Daily Nous)
In “21% versus 79%: Explaining Philosophy’s Gender Disparities with Stereotyping and Identification,” forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, authors Debbie Ma, Clennie Webster, Nanae Tachibe, and Robert Gressis (all at CSU Northridge), present data that, they argue, supports the idea that male domination in philosophy could be eroded ... by changing how it is taught.
They find that students who haven’t taken much philosophy do not have a sense that the field is male-dominated, but they come to have this view the more philosophy they study, and that further, the degree to which women students see philosophy as masculine, the less interested they are in majoring in it."
—From 'The Perception of Philosophy as Masculine' (Daily Nous)
Wednesday, October 18, 2017
Feminist Epistemology in Literature
'The Husband Stitch' is a short story by Carmen Maria Machado which explores some of the epistemological consequences of gender. The article, 'What I Don't Tell My Students about 'The Husband Stitch',' explicitly explores the themes present in the fiction as a critique against certain modes of philosophical thinking. For example, in her article, Jane Dykema discusses Occam's Razor and how it can be used to (erroneously) discredit the testimony of women. We will be discussing the role of epistemic credibility in the feminist philosophy reading group this week, and this short story, and associated commentary, provide a unique literary exploration of this topic.
From Dykema: "Do you feel it, too? Or can you imagine it? The perils of living in a world made by a different gender? The justified and unjustified mistrust? The near-constant experience of being disbelieved, of learning to question your own sanity? How much more it hurts to be let down by 'one of the good ones'?"
The Husband Stitch
What I Don't Tell My Students about 'The Husband Stitch'
From Dykema: "Do you feel it, too? Or can you imagine it? The perils of living in a world made by a different gender? The justified and unjustified mistrust? The near-constant experience of being disbelieved, of learning to question your own sanity? How much more it hurts to be let down by 'one of the good ones'?"
The Husband Stitch
What I Don't Tell My Students about 'The Husband Stitch'
Tuesday, October 17, 2017
Week 2 Welfare: Getting Real About Mental Health.
Happy Week 2 of the term, philosophers!
Something that I have noticed from my time at Oxford is the way that other students tend to act about mental health and self-care. I think a lot of people here realize the importance of these topics; however, it seems like many people (myself included) spend so much time urging others to take care of themselves and seek help when they’re struggling that we let ourselves down in that regard. It’s great to encourage others to make healthy decisions, but it’s even better to practice what you preach! One problem with doing so is that it can be incredibly difficult to share these problems and talk about them. I definitely struggle with this: it can be hard to open up when I’m having problems or feeling insecure. As a result, I tend to bottle up the feelings for a long time until the negative thoughts finally end up manifesting themselves as full-blown anxiety or even panic attacks. It’s okay to be honest about these kind of things: it doesn’t make me less of a philosopher, or less serious about my work. It just means that sometimes, meeting the bare minimum is a really difficult task. However, it's important to remember that there is an amazing support system here at Oxford, and if you’re struggling in any way, you can always reach out to one of the student representatives (such as AJ or I) or use the welfare resources at your college. Being a philosophy grad student is hard enough, and it’s totally normal to need help from time to time; please don’t be afraid to ask for help.
As always, I have included some resources, but if you are struggling with this in any way, feel free to shoot me a message, even if you just want to grab a coffee and have a casual chat!
I Wish We Could Talk More Openly about Mental Health in Academia
Mental Health in Academia
18 Comics You Need to See if You're Dealing with Anxiety
Something that I have noticed from my time at Oxford is the way that other students tend to act about mental health and self-care. I think a lot of people here realize the importance of these topics; however, it seems like many people (myself included) spend so much time urging others to take care of themselves and seek help when they’re struggling that we let ourselves down in that regard. It’s great to encourage others to make healthy decisions, but it’s even better to practice what you preach! One problem with doing so is that it can be incredibly difficult to share these problems and talk about them. I definitely struggle with this: it can be hard to open up when I’m having problems or feeling insecure. As a result, I tend to bottle up the feelings for a long time until the negative thoughts finally end up manifesting themselves as full-blown anxiety or even panic attacks. It’s okay to be honest about these kind of things: it doesn’t make me less of a philosopher, or less serious about my work. It just means that sometimes, meeting the bare minimum is a really difficult task. However, it's important to remember that there is an amazing support system here at Oxford, and if you’re struggling in any way, you can always reach out to one of the student representatives (such as AJ or I) or use the welfare resources at your college. Being a philosophy grad student is hard enough, and it’s totally normal to need help from time to time; please don’t be afraid to ask for help.
As always, I have included some resources, but if you are struggling with this in any way, feel free to shoot me a message, even if you just want to grab a coffee and have a casual chat!
I Wish We Could Talk More Openly about Mental Health in Academia
Mental Health in Academia
18 Comics You Need to See if You're Dealing with Anxiety
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 2)
Reading: Jenkins, Fiona. “Epistemic Credibility and Women in Philosophy.” Australian Feminist Studies 29:80 (2014) 161-170.
Summary: Women in philosophy are disproportionately under-represented at elite institutions, and publishing patterns can be analysed to show that the ‘top’ journals publish articles by women at rates significantly lower than even the levels of women who have made it into tenure at these elite universities. In such journals, the type of epistemology that Lorraine Code describes as ‘immune to feminist critique’ is dominant, assuming that neutrality is the benchmark for knowledge, and that knowers float free of the encumbrances of situation. It is right to worry, as Code does, that feminist and critical race theory hold an increasingly fragile place in disciplinary philosophy and that disciplinary philosophy itself is thereby the loser. The question of how to reinvigorate radical projects of contestation is both urgent and vexing. To align this issue with the under-representation of women in philosophy poses its own problems, as this article explores: for women need not be feminist philosophers, and feminist philosophy can be a project of assimilation into the mainstream as much as it can be a project of radical transformation of disciplinary norms. There may be something to learn, however, both about equity in the academy and the fate of critique by considering the relation between prevailing institutional conditions, disciplinary trajectories and the gendering of prestige in the academic sector.
Link: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08164649.2014.928190
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: Women in philosophy are disproportionately under-represented at elite institutions, and publishing patterns can be analysed to show that the ‘top’ journals publish articles by women at rates significantly lower than even the levels of women who have made it into tenure at these elite universities. In such journals, the type of epistemology that Lorraine Code describes as ‘immune to feminist critique’ is dominant, assuming that neutrality is the benchmark for knowledge, and that knowers float free of the encumbrances of situation. It is right to worry, as Code does, that feminist and critical race theory hold an increasingly fragile place in disciplinary philosophy and that disciplinary philosophy itself is thereby the loser. The question of how to reinvigorate radical projects of contestation is both urgent and vexing. To align this issue with the under-representation of women in philosophy poses its own problems, as this article explores: for women need not be feminist philosophers, and feminist philosophy can be a project of assimilation into the mainstream as much as it can be a project of radical transformation of disciplinary norms. There may be something to learn, however, both about equity in the academy and the fate of critique by considering the relation between prevailing institutional conditions, disciplinary trajectories and the gendering of prestige in the academic sector.
Link: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08164649.2014.928190
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Sunday, October 8, 2017
Week 1 Welfare: Taking Time for Yourself.
The beginning of Michaelmas can be an overwhelming time for students, old and new. If you’ve just started at Oxford, then you’ve likely been busy attending freshers events nearly every day, meeting new people at your college and department (and promptly forgetting everyone’s names!), and trying to figure out your way around the city. For returning students, you may have just turned in essays, spent all summer writing papers or working on applications, and are now dreading the thought of returning to the rhythm of classes, seminars, etc.
This is a busy time, filled with activities and people and endless to-do lists. And it can be incredibly draining. So take a deep breath and realize that you choose how much work you take on this term.
During my first term at Oxford, I definitely tried to do too much. I was going to three or four different classes, reading groups, multiple talks a week, and still trying to write my essays and have a social life. There are so many opportunities at Oxford that it’s tempting to take advantage of as many of them as you can. But remember to take time for yourself. Your education is a priority (of course!), but you are an even bigger priority.
Some articles on making your well-being a priority and maintaining a work-life balance:
The Importance of Self-Care: Advice to Graduate Students
6 Ways to Survive Grad School: Work-Life Balance
5 Tested Tips to Battle Burnout with Better Self-Care
As always, feel free to reach out to me if you need a supportive friend! :)
This is a busy time, filled with activities and people and endless to-do lists. And it can be incredibly draining. So take a deep breath and realize that you choose how much work you take on this term.
During my first term at Oxford, I definitely tried to do too much. I was going to three or four different classes, reading groups, multiple talks a week, and still trying to write my essays and have a social life. There are so many opportunities at Oxford that it’s tempting to take advantage of as many of them as you can. But remember to take time for yourself. Your education is a priority (of course!), but you are an even bigger priority.
Some articles on making your well-being a priority and maintaining a work-life balance:
The Importance of Self-Care: Advice to Graduate Students
6 Ways to Survive Grad School: Work-Life Balance
5 Tested Tips to Battle Burnout with Better Self-Care
As always, feel free to reach out to me if you need a supportive friend! :)
Wednesday, October 4, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week One)
Reading: Haslanger, Sally. “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)” Hypatia, 23:2 (2008) 210-223.
Summary: Sally Haslanger's article, "Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)" (2008), has been a major catalyst for change, since she herself is widely recognized for her work in mainstream analytic philosophy, and she is on the faculty at MIT. The significance of her article is demonstrated by the fact that nearly every subsequent paper on the topic of women in philosophy has cited hers. In addition to personal anecdotes from Haslanger on her experience as a female philosopher, this article includes an overview of empirical data on the representation of women authors in seven journals in philosophy (Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Philosophical Review, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophy and Public Affairs).
Link: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01195.x/abstract
Summary: Sally Haslanger's article, "Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)" (2008), has been a major catalyst for change, since she herself is widely recognized for her work in mainstream analytic philosophy, and she is on the faculty at MIT. The significance of her article is demonstrated by the fact that nearly every subsequent paper on the topic of women in philosophy has cited hers. In addition to personal anecdotes from Haslanger on her experience as a female philosopher, this article includes an overview of empirical data on the representation of women authors in seven journals in philosophy (Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Philosophical Review, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophy and Public Affairs).
Link: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01195.x/abstract
Just a reminder that our first meeting will be from 9:00 to 10:30 am on Thursday (12 October), in the Ryle Room at the Radcliffe Humanities Building. If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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