In addition to Krause's “Contested Questions, Current Trajectories: Feminism in Political Theory Today” (2011), we will also be reading her "Beyond Non-Domination: Agency, Inequality and the Meaning of Freedom" (2013).
Link: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0191453712470360
Sunday, November 26, 2017
Saturday, November 25, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 8)
Reading: Krause, Sharon R. “Contested Questions, Current Trajectories: Feminism in Political Theory Today.” Politics & Gender, vol. 7, no. 1, 2011, pp. 105–111.
Summary: "I once mentioned to a prominent feminist scholar that I was using one of her books in my course on feminism and political theory. She looked at me blankly for a moment and then replied, “Feminism and political theory? I thought feminism is political theory.” She was right of course; in some sense, everything that is feminist theory is also political theory. Feminism illuminates gendered relations of power in politics and social life, after all, and it contributes (however indirectly) to the larger project of transforming them. Moreover, since the rise of “second wave” feminism in the 1970s, feminist theorists have significantly reshaped political theory as a discipline, moving crucial questions from the margins of the field to its center, questions about gender equity and justice, the constitution of the political subject, the demands of difference, the intersecting dynamics of domination, the differential effects of globalization, and the conditions of freedom, among other things. As a result, much of what we think of as “mainstream” political theory is now also feminist theory. This is often true even of work that does not make women or gender its sole subject matter, as the leading voices in the field increasingly are scholars whose work has been shaped by literatures central to feminism and who think about politics in ways that are informed by a critical consciousness of the gendered quality of power relations."
Link: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: "I once mentioned to a prominent feminist scholar that I was using one of her books in my course on feminism and political theory. She looked at me blankly for a moment and then replied, “Feminism and political theory? I thought feminism is political theory.” She was right of course; in some sense, everything that is feminist theory is also political theory. Feminism illuminates gendered relations of power in politics and social life, after all, and it contributes (however indirectly) to the larger project of transforming them. Moreover, since the rise of “second wave” feminism in the 1970s, feminist theorists have significantly reshaped political theory as a discipline, moving crucial questions from the margins of the field to its center, questions about gender equity and justice, the constitution of the political subject, the demands of difference, the intersecting dynamics of domination, the differential effects of globalization, and the conditions of freedom, among other things. As a result, much of what we think of as “mainstream” political theory is now also feminist theory. This is often true even of work that does not make women or gender its sole subject matter, as the leading voices in the field increasingly are scholars whose work has been shaped by literatures central to feminism and who think about politics in ways that are informed by a critical consciousness of the gendered quality of power relations."
Link: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Sunday, November 19, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 7)
Reading: Draft of "On the Distinction between Objectifying Attitudes and Objectifying Actions."
Summary: In this essay, I attempt to bolster Nussbaum’s account of objectification by clarifying and articulating the distinction that she draws between seeing and treating a person as an object. I defend her account from thinkers like Haslanger (1993), who claims that both of these are necessary for objectification (while Nussbaum claims that either is sufficient for objectification), and Halwani (2008, 2010), who claims that Nussbaum’s account is too broad, as only actions can constitute a good definition of objectification. I articulate what it means to ‘see’ someone as an object, and argue for the value of a definition of objectification that includes these objectifying attitudes. Finally, I discuss the ethical status of these two types of objectification—I claim, along with Nussbaum, that act objectification is impermissible when it occurs in a non- consensual manner or if it occurs in such a way as to disregard or harm the humanity of the objectified individual. I then construct a position, based on work from Kant, for the moral permissibility of attitude objectification, and show how this position is compatible with Nussbaum’s account.
To access this week's reading, please email me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: In this essay, I attempt to bolster Nussbaum’s account of objectification by clarifying and articulating the distinction that she draws between seeing and treating a person as an object. I defend her account from thinkers like Haslanger (1993), who claims that both of these are necessary for objectification (while Nussbaum claims that either is sufficient for objectification), and Halwani (2008, 2010), who claims that Nussbaum’s account is too broad, as only actions can constitute a good definition of objectification. I articulate what it means to ‘see’ someone as an object, and argue for the value of a definition of objectification that includes these objectifying attitudes. Finally, I discuss the ethical status of these two types of objectification—I claim, along with Nussbaum, that act objectification is impermissible when it occurs in a non- consensual manner or if it occurs in such a way as to disregard or harm the humanity of the objectified individual. I then construct a position, based on work from Kant, for the moral permissibility of attitude objectification, and show how this position is compatible with Nussbaum’s account.
To access this week's reading, please email me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Sunday, November 12, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 6)
Reading: Anderson, Scott A. "Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution." Ethics 112.4 (2002): 748-780.
Summary: This article outlines the radical feminist critique of prostitution and then describes how liberals have responded to this critique, in particular, the suggestion that prostitution, including our attitudes toward it, can and should be reformed. To make progress in resolving this dispute, I first step back from a narrow focus on prostitution and examine the broader role that certain social regulations of sexual behavior play in protecting individual sexual autonomy throughout our society. These regulations serve as a barrier between sexual activity and the activities of production and commerce. After showing how sexual autonomy is protected by these sorts of barriers, I return to the radical feminists’ critique and argue that a prohibition on prostitution can be justified because of the role it plays in defending the sexual autonomy of the poorest, least-powerful members of our society. This is important for those people most vulnerable to becoming prostitutes, but it is also necessary in order to pursue justice between rich and poor, as well as equality between women and men.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/339672?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: This article outlines the radical feminist critique of prostitution and then describes how liberals have responded to this critique, in particular, the suggestion that prostitution, including our attitudes toward it, can and should be reformed. To make progress in resolving this dispute, I first step back from a narrow focus on prostitution and examine the broader role that certain social regulations of sexual behavior play in protecting individual sexual autonomy throughout our society. These regulations serve as a barrier between sexual activity and the activities of production and commerce. After showing how sexual autonomy is protected by these sorts of barriers, I return to the radical feminists’ critique and argue that a prohibition on prostitution can be justified because of the role it plays in defending the sexual autonomy of the poorest, least-powerful members of our society. This is important for those people most vulnerable to becoming prostitutes, but it is also necessary in order to pursue justice between rich and poor, as well as equality between women and men.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/339672?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Monday, November 6, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 5)
Reading: Adams, Carol J. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing USA (2015); Chapter 1, The Sexual Politics of Meat, and Chapter 2, The Rape of Animals, The Butchering of Women.
Summary: "The Sexual Politics of Meat" argues that what, or more precisely who, we eat is determined by the patriarchal politics of our culture, and that the meanings attached to meat eating are often clustered around virility. First published in 1990, "The Sexual Politics of Meat" is a landmark text in the ongoing debates about animal rights. In the two decades since, the book has inspired controversy and heated debate. We live in a world in which men still have considerable power over women, both in public and in private. Carol Adams argues that gender politics is inextricably related to how we view animals, especially animals who are consumed. And she argues too that vegetarianism and fighting for animal rights fit perfectly alongside working to improve the lives of disenfranchised and suffering people, under the wide umbrella of compassionate activism.
To access this week's reading, please email me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: "The Sexual Politics of Meat" argues that what, or more precisely who, we eat is determined by the patriarchal politics of our culture, and that the meanings attached to meat eating are often clustered around virility. First published in 1990, "The Sexual Politics of Meat" is a landmark text in the ongoing debates about animal rights. In the two decades since, the book has inspired controversy and heated debate. We live in a world in which men still have considerable power over women, both in public and in private. Carol Adams argues that gender politics is inextricably related to how we view animals, especially animals who are consumed. And she argues too that vegetarianism and fighting for animal rights fit perfectly alongside working to improve the lives of disenfranchised and suffering people, under the wide umbrella of compassionate activism.
To access this week's reading, please email me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Saturday, October 28, 2017
Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 4)
Reading: Woollard, Fiona. "Motherhood and Mistakes about Defeasible Duties to Benefit." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2016).
Summary: Discussion of the behaviour of pregnant women and mothers, in academic literature, medical advice given to mothers, mainstream media and social media, assumes that a mother who fails to do something to benefit her child is liable for moral criticism unless she can provide sufficient countervailing considerations to justify her decision. I reconstruct the normally implicit reasoning that leads to this assumption and show that it is mistaken. First, I show that the discussion assumes that if any action might benefit her child, the mother has a defeasible duty to perform that action. I suggest that this assumption is implicitly supported by two arguments but that each argument is unsound. The first argument conflates moral reasons and defeasible duties; the second misunderstands the scope of a defeasible duty to benefit. This argument has important practical and theoretical implications: practically, it provides a response to a highly damaging discourse on maternal behaviour; theoretically, it provides the framework for a clearer understanding of the scope and nature of defeasible duties to benefit.
Link: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12355/abstract
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Summary: Discussion of the behaviour of pregnant women and mothers, in academic literature, medical advice given to mothers, mainstream media and social media, assumes that a mother who fails to do something to benefit her child is liable for moral criticism unless she can provide sufficient countervailing considerations to justify her decision. I reconstruct the normally implicit reasoning that leads to this assumption and show that it is mistaken. First, I show that the discussion assumes that if any action might benefit her child, the mother has a defeasible duty to perform that action. I suggest that this assumption is implicitly supported by two arguments but that each argument is unsound. The first argument conflates moral reasons and defeasible duties; the second misunderstands the scope of a defeasible duty to benefit. This argument has important practical and theoretical implications: practically, it provides a response to a highly damaging discourse on maternal behaviour; theoretically, it provides the framework for a clearer understanding of the scope and nature of defeasible duties to benefit.
Link: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12355/abstract
If you have any questions, or difficulty accessing the reading, please do not hesitate to contact me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
Update: Feminist Philosophy Reading List (Weeks 7 & 8)
Please note the following changes to the feminist philosophy reading list for Michaelmas:
I will distribute copies of my paper draft in advance for Week 7. I hope to see many of you this Thursday to discuss Alcoff's "Visible Identities" (2006)!
- Week 7: Figueroa, Charlotte. "On the Distinction between Objectifying Attitudes and Objectifying Actions" (draft).
- Week 8: Krause, Sharon R. “Contested Questions, Current Trajectories: Feminism in Political Theory Today.” Politics & Gender, vol. 7, no. 1, 2011, pp. 105–111.
I will distribute copies of my paper draft in advance for Week 7. I hope to see many of you this Thursday to discuss Alcoff's "Visible Identities" (2006)!
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