Feminist Philosophy Reading Group (Week 7)

Reading: Draft of "On the Distinction between Objectifying Attitudes and Objectifying Actions."

Summary: In this essay, I attempt to bolster Nussbaum’s account of objectification by clarifying and articulating the distinction that she draws between seeing and treating a person as an object. I defend her account from thinkers like Haslanger (1993), who claims that both of these are necessary for objectification (while Nussbaum claims that either is sufficient for objectification), and Halwani (2008, 2010), who claims that Nussbaum’s account is too broad, as only actions can constitute a good definition of objectification. I articulate what it means to ‘see’ someone as an object, and argue for the value of a definition of objectification that includes these objectifying attitudes. Finally, I discuss the ethical status of these two types of objectification—I claim, along with Nussbaum, that act objectification is impermissible when it occurs in a non- consensual manner or if it occurs in such a way as to disregard or harm the humanity of the objectified individual. I then construct a position, based on work from Kant, for the moral permissibility of attitude objectification, and show how this position is compatible with Nussbaum’s account.

To access this week's reading, please email me at: charlotte.figueroa@philosophy.ox.ac.uk